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PETITION 
Appellee and Plaintiff Larry J. Coet Used Car 
Department petitions the Court of Appeals to "rehear" this 
appeal, pursuant to Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Under the circumstances, this petition 
functionally constitutes a request that the Court "hear" 
this matter, in that the Court did not afford Coet a hearing 
before ruling. See Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3); Memorandum 
Decision, April 27, 1995. 
Coet filed its Brief September 26, 1994. Appellant 
Lopez filed a Reply Brief March 17, 1995, almost five (5) 
months late. The Court, approximately one month later, 
reversed with only the following, cryptic comment: 
"We reverse for the reasons stated in 
appellant's reply brief." 
If the cursory statements in Lopez7 Reply Brief truly 
reflect the law, then this Court has implicitly endorsed a 
significant modification of the law as it pertains to 
recourse provisions under third-party financing paper, and 
to assignments. The Decision also ignores the findings made 
by the Trial Court (Dennis Fuchs, Judge) and the testimony 
of First Security Bank's officer Shirl Nichols and Coet's 
Marsha Coet. The Decision effectively eviscerates the 
repurchase provisions of the Installment Sale Contract at 
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issue, and deprives Coet of all rights under the repurchased 
contract - without any cogent explanation of why Coet should 
be deprived of those rights. At the very least, if this 
Court is going to reverse based on the statements in Lopez' 
Reply Brief, then it should do so in a published decision. 
It should do so, because Lopez, in his Reply, does not 
accurately portray existing law; and an endorsement of 
Lopez7 statements implicitly effects a significant change in 
the law. 
This case involves the purchase by Lopez from Coet of a 
used Ford Bronco. Lopez made a significant down payment and 
financed the balance through execution of an Installment 
Sale Contract (the "Contract"), which was subsequently 
assigned by Coet to First Security Bank, for value. Lopez 
made three payments to First Security Bank, then stopped. 
He threatened to sue First Security Bank and Coet.1 First 
Security requested that Coet repurchase the Contract, 
consistent with the Assignment/Recourse provisions of the 
Contract. Coet did so. Lopez subsequently sued Coet for 
fraud and other claims. Coet defended, and counterclaimed 
for a deficiency (which included reasonable attorneys fees, 
per the Contract). The Trial Court found against Lopez on 
1
 Lopez, in fact, named First Security as a Defendant, 
but did not serve First Security. 
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all his causes of action and dismissed them with prejudice. 
It found for Coet on its counterclaim. 
On appeal, Lopez challenges only the award of attorneys 
fees and the Contract based award of interest at the rate of 
14.5 percent, as opposed to the non-contract statutory rate 
of 10 percent. Lopez theorizes that because First Security 
stamped the Contract "PAID 3-13-92" when it delivered the 
Contract back to Coet, that Lopez was therefore released 
from any further contractual obligation under the Contract. 
Lopez volunteers that he had only an "equitable" obligation 
to repay Coet the sum it had paid to First Security. 
First Security Bank's officer Shirl Nichols testified 
that First Security Bank did not prepare a formal notice of 
assignment because industry standard did not require it. 
First Security's view was that inasmuch as Coet was the 
first-party creditor on the Contract, Coet could simply 
repurchase the Contract. The Contract specifically defines 
conditions under which "you [Coet] agree to repurchase the 
Agreement on demand by paying us the full unpaid balance 
together with accrued interest owing on the Agreement . . . 
_i_" (Emphasis added) . Contrary to Lopez' representation in 
his Reply, Marsha Coet (R. 857, lines 21-25) and First 
Security's Shirl Nichols (R. 816, lines 18-20; R. 821, lines 
20-25) both testified that they understood that Coet had 
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repurchased the Contract. Subsequent to its repurchase of 
the Contract, Coet notified Lopez that it had done so and 
that he should make subsequent payments, to Coet. This 
notice complied with Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-318. 
The fallacy of Lopez' argument, which this Court 
endorses by reversing, is that there must necessarily be a 
writing entitled "Assignment" and that, if there is not, 
then Lopez was released of all contractual-based 
obligations. This is simply not the law. An assignment 
need not be in writing. 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignments §84 (1963). 
No particular form is required to effectuate an assignment 
of rights under a contract. All that is required is that 
the assignor express an intention to transfer his right to 
the assignee. 4 Corbin on Contracts §879 at 528 (1951 ed.); 
see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §324 Comment a; 
and authorities cited in Appellee's Brief. Parol evidence 
may be relied on to determine intention. 4 Corbin on 
Contracts §879. Contrary to Lopez' representation in his 
Reply, testimony was elicited that confirms First Security's 
intention that Coet succeed to its rights under the 
Contract. 
It is absurd to think that Coet gratuitously undertook 
to pay off the Contract for Lopez' benefit. Its intention, 
as established by Marsha Coet's testimony and the Notice it 
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gave to Lopez, was that it had repurchased the Contract and 
that Lopez' obligations under the Contract remained intact. 
Lopez, without relying on any authority, suggests that 
because First Security stamped the Contract "PAID 3-13-92" 
when it delivered the same to Coet,2 then Lopez has only an 
"equitable" obligation to repay Coet the sum Coet paid First 
Security Bank. This unique theory, while appearing to 
benefit Lopez, has insidious implications for debtors in 
Lopez' position. According to Lopez, any first-party 
creditor (on third-party paper) who re-acquires the paper 
from the third party assignee by paying off the balance owed 
acquires an "equitable" right to be reimbursed; but all 
contractual-based obligations are extinguished. That would 
necessarily include contractual provisions that benefit the 
debtor. Thus, and for instance, the creditor would have the 
right to immediately collect its "equitable" claim, even if 
the debtor had been current on the contract-based 
installment, repayment schedule. Interest, for example, 
would default to the legal 10 percent rate, even if the 
contract provided for a lower rate of interest. 
2
 It should be noted that a copy of the Contract, 
stamped "PAID", was not delivered to Lopez. This copy of 
the Contract, contrary to Lopez' statement in his Reply, was 
in Coet's file, and was faxed by First Security to Coet. 
Coet produced the same to Lopez during the course of 
discovery. 
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The Court's Decision also leads to the conclusion that 
First Security acted negligently in stamping the Contract 
"PAID,11 and in not executing a formal document entitled 
"Assignment," based on what it understood to be industry 
practice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should revisit its Memorandum Decision. The 
law, as embraced by Lopez' Reply Brief, represents a quantum 
departure from existing law, with potentially adverse and 
unexpected implications to debtors and creditors, including 
financial institutions, who undertake financing by use of 
third-party paper. If the Court intends to endorse such 
significant departures from existing law, it ought to do so 
only after the opportunity for hearing and publication of 
its decision. 
DATED this _t±_ day of May, 1995. 
As counsel for the Appellee, I certify that this 
Petition is presented in good faith, and not for delay. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
By / j/Kd 4>^ \ 
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Defendant/Appellee, Larry J. 
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